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Abstract
In this paper, we show that low trend inﬂation strongly aﬀects the dynamics of
a standard Neo-keynesian model where monetary policy is described by a standard
Taylor rule. In particular, we show that trend inﬂation: (i) enlarges the indeter-
minacy region in the parameter space, substantially altering the so-called Taylor
principle; (ii) changes the dynamic responses of the economy. Furthermore, we gen-
eralize the basic analysis to diﬀerent types of Taylor rules, inertial policy rules and
indexation schemes. The key point is that, whatever the set up, the literature on
Taylor rules cannot disregard average inﬂation in both theoretical and empirical
analysis.
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Average inﬂa t i o ni nt h ep o s t - w a rp e r i o di nd e v e l o p e dc o u n t r i e sw a sm o d e r a t e l yd i ﬀerent
from zero and varied across countries.1 Nonetheless, most of the vast literature on
monetary policy rules worked with models log-linearized around a zero inﬂation steady
state (see e.g., Clarida et al., 1999, Galí, 2003, Woodford, 2003, or the book edited by
Taylor, 1999). This paper aims to accomodate this manifest inconsistency.
We generalize a standard Neo-Keynesian model with Calvo staggered price by taking
a log-linear approximation around a general level of steady state inﬂation.2 Then we
use a Taylor rule to close the model and address the question of how the properties of
our economy change as the trend inﬂation level varies.3
Our key ﬁnding is that trend inﬂation greatly aﬀects the existing results in the
literature. In particular moderate levels of trend inﬂation: (i) modify the determinacy
region in the parameters space; (ii) alter the impulse response function of the model
economy after a cost-push shock. As a consequence, trend inﬂation largely changes also
the (unconditional) variances of key variables, such as inﬂation and output.
With respect to (i), we show that trend inﬂation substantially changes the well-
known determinacy condition that the literature labelled the Taylor principle. This
result is due to the distortions trend inﬂation causes in the long-run properties of the
model and, particularly, in the steady state relationship between inﬂation and output, a
surprisingly neglected issue in the literature. The long-run Phillips curve is highly non-
linear in the Neo-Keynesian model: it is positively sloped when steady state inﬂation is
zero, but then turns quite rapidly negative for extremely low value of trend inﬂation,
because of the strong price-dispersion eﬀect.4 We will show that this has signiﬁcant
implications on the celebrated Taylor principle. The results in most of the literature
1For example, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b) calibrate trend inﬂation for the U.S. to 4.2%, based
on data from 1960-1998. In the same period Germany, Italy, Spain, and UK exhibit an average inﬂation
equals to respectively 3.22%, 8.12%, 7.1% and 9% (source: OECD).
2In this paper, we abstract for other possible form of frictions, since we want to investigate the
relationship between Taylor rules and trend inﬂation.
3In the following analysis we shall use indiﬀerently trend inﬂation or long-run inﬂation to denote the
level of inﬂation rate in the deterministic steady state.
4See Ascari (1998) and Ascari (2004).
1are therefore based on a case (i.e., zero steady state inﬂation) that is both empirical
unrealistic and theoretically very special.
Our key result is then generalized and proved to be robust to: (i) diﬀerent kinds
of Taylor type rules proposed in the literature (contemporaneous, backward-looking,
forward-looking and hybrid, see e.g., Clarida et al., 2000, Bullard and Mitra, 2002); (ii)
inertial Taylor rules for all the cases in (i); (iii) indexation schemes used in the literature
(see, e.g., Yun, 1996 and Christiano et al., 2005); (iv) diﬀerent parameter values.
In sum, this paper shows that the literature on monetary policy rules cannot neglect
trend inﬂation both in the empirical and theoretical analysis, because the speciﬁcation
of the theoretical model and then all the results are very sensitive to low and moderate
trend inﬂation levels, as empirically observed in western countries.
Just to give an example, the seminal analysis in Clarida et al. (2000) can be mis-
leading. Indeed, Clarida et al. (2000) data set features an average inﬂation for the US
economy quite diﬀerent from zero inﬂation, while their analysis is based on a theoreti-
cal model that assumes zero trend inﬂation. On the one hand, positive trend inﬂation
changes the determinacy region, and then the well-known Taylor principle, such that
in order to label the equilibrium determinate one needs to take trend inﬂation into ac-
count. On the other hand, once an equilibrium is identiﬁed to pass from determinate to
indeterminate or vice versa, it is still to be investigated what is the relative contribution
of a change in the monetary policy regime (i.e, a change in the Taylor rule parameters)
rather than a change in the trend inﬂation level.
Another contribution of the paper is to oﬀer a detailed presentation of the standard
log-linear Neo-Keynesian model approximated around a general trend inﬂation level
with and without indexation schemes. As such the paper generalizes the model in
Ascari and Ropele (2004) allowing for indexation schemes, and complements a series of
recent papers. Indeed, only very few papers in the literature allow for positive trend
inﬂation level. Ascari (2004) illustrates a standard Neo-keynesian model log-linearised
around a general trend inﬂation level. Ascari and Ropele (2004) analyzes how optimal
short-run monetary policy changes with trend inﬂation. Khan et al. (2003) instead
solves the optimal monetary policy problem and then investigate the dynamics of the
economy around the given optimal steady state inﬂation level. Schmitt-Grohe and
2Uribe (2004a,b) simulates the model under diﬀerent Taylor type rules calibrating average
inﬂation on US data, but it does not study the eﬀects of changing trend inﬂation levels.
Moreover, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a,b) allows for the indexation scheme proposed
by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), but simulates the model up to second-
order, so that the model is not log-linearised.
Finally, Kiley (2004) is a very related paper to ours. Kiley (2004) investigates the
eﬀect of trend inﬂation in a model where prices are staggered a là Taylor (1979) and
monetary policy is described by Taylor rules.5 Our paper also complements this very
recent paper by assuming the more popular Calvo (1983) staggered pricing framework,
and by generalizing the results to diﬀerent Taylor type rules and indexation schemes.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 displays
the log-linearised version of it. Section 4 then presents the main results of the paper,
by looking at the behavior of the model when monetary policy is described by a con-
temporaneous Taylor rule. Section 5 tests the robustness of our key ﬁndings to many
alternative assumptions, as illustrated above. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we describe a simple New Keynesian stochastic general equilibrium model,
similar to Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), Galí (2003) and Woodford (2003), general-
ized to allow for positive trend inﬂation (as in Ascari, 2004) and indexation.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by inﬁnitively lived households whose instantaneous utility
function is increasing in the consumption of the ﬁnal good (Ct) and real money balances





















5We became aware of Kiley (2004) when we already embarked working on this paper. Kiley (2004)
shows that also in Taylor (1979) type of framework, trend inﬂation inﬂuences the determinacy region
and the unconditional variance of inﬂation. Kiley (2004) model is however quite stylized (two-period
staggering) and the analysis "kept as simple as possible" (p. 26). We therefore complements and
generalizes its results.
3where the positive parameters σc,σm and σn represents the inverse of the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution in consumption, real money balances and labor supply,
respectively, while χm and χn are positive constants.
At a given period t, the representative household faces the following nominal ﬂow
budget constraint
PtCt + Mt + Bt ≤ WtNt + Mt−1 +( 1+it−1)Bt−1 + Ft + TRt (2)
where Pt is the price of the ﬁnal good, Mt represents holding of nominal money, Bt
represents holding of bonds oﬀering a one-period nominal return it, Wt is the nominal
wage and Ft are ﬁrms proﬁts rebated to the households. In addition, each period the
government makes lump-sum nominal transfers to households equal to TRt. The house-















































where β ∈ (0,1) i st h es u b j e c t i v er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ea n dE0 denotes the expecta-
tion operator conditional on the time t =0information set. The resulting ﬁrst order
conditions yield:





























(4), (5), (6) have the usual straightforward economic interpretation.6
6Note that the momentary utiltiy function is additively separable in all the three arguments, con-
sumption, real money balances and labor, so that it follows that real money balances will not enter
in any of the other structural equations of the model. That is, the money demand equation becomes
completely recursive to the rest of the system equations.
42.2 Final Good Producers
In each period t,aﬁnal good Yt is produced by perfectly competitive ﬁrms, combining











Taking prices as given the ﬁnal good producer chooses the quantities of intermediate











0 Pt (i)Yt (i)di
¾
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The zero proﬁt condition in the ﬁnal good sector brings about the following expres-









2.3 Intermediate Good Producers
The intermediate inputs Yt (i) are produced by a continuum of ﬁrms indexed by i ∈ [0,1],
with the following production technology with constant returns to scale to labor:
Yt (i)=Nt (i). (10)
The intermediate goods sector is characterized by the fact that prices are sticky. In
particular, intermediate good producers act as monopolistic competitors and set prices
according to a standard discrete version of the mechanism put forward by Calvo (1983).
In each period, there exists a ﬁxed probability (1 − α) a c c o r d i n gt ow h i c haﬁrm can
re-optimize its nominal price. On the contrary, with probability α the ﬁrm cannot set
a new price. In the literature, we can distinguish three diﬀerent hypothesis about what
happens to the price in this latter case: (i) No indexation: the price does not change;
(ii) Indexation to trend inﬂation (e.g., Yun (1996)): the price is automatically fully
or partially adjusted according to the level of trend inﬂation; (iii) Indexation to past
5inﬂation (e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005))7: the price is automatically
fully or partially adjusted according to the past inﬂation level.
1. No indexation























t (i) denotes the new optimal price of producer i , TCr
t+j (Yt+j (i)) the real total
cost function and ∆t,t+j is the stochastic discount factor. The solution to this problem





















t (i) denotes the real marginal costs function, which, given the production




Pt , and hence equal across producers i.T h e
real marginal costs thus depends only upon aggregate quantities, namely the real wage.
2. Partial indexation to long-run inﬂation (LRI)
Under this assumption, a ﬁrm that cannot re-optimize its price, update the price




where ¯ π is the steady state inﬂation level and ε ∈ [0,1] is a parameter that measures
the degree of indexation. If ε =1there is full indexation, if ε =0there is no indexation























7See also Maury and Sahuc (2004).




















3. Partial indexation to past inﬂation (PI)
Under this assumption, a ﬁrm that cannot re-optimize its price, update the price







Pt−2 is the inﬂation level in the previous period and ε ∈ [0,1] is again





























t+1for j>0 and equal zero for j =0 .T h e



























where Ms is aggregate nominal money supply. Most importantly, we assume that in




where ¯ π is the (gross) rate of nominal money supply growth, which in steady state
coincides with steady state inﬂation.
7As stated in the Introduction, this paper takes the trend inﬂation rate, ¯ π,a se x -
ogenous to the model. In the short run, hence, monetary policy aims at stabilizing
inﬂation and output gap around the long-run targets in response to exogenous shocks
buﬀeting the economy. Finally, we assume that monetary policy is implemented through
a Taylor-type rule for the control of the short-term nominal interest rate. Therefore,
in the subsequent sections, we will use a Taylor-type rule to close the model and thus
equation (5) will become redundant.8
2.5 Market clearing conditions
The market clearing conditions in the goods markets, in the money market and in the
labour market are simply:













3 The log-linearized model
Log-linearizing (4) and (6) we obtain
σn ˆ Nt + σcˆ Yt = ˆ Wt − ˆ Pt (19)
ˆ Yt = Etˆ Yt+1 − σ−1
c [ˆ ıt − Etˆ πt+1] (20)
where hatted variables denote percentage deviations from deterministic steady state and





. Moreover, we used the market clearing condition ˆ Yt = ˆ Ct to obtain the
standard forward-looking IS curve (20).
3.1 Generalized New Keynesian Phillips Curves
The log-linearization of the equations for optimal price under trend inﬂation are deﬁ-
nitely more cumbersome than the standard NKPC calculated log-linearising (11) around
zero inﬂation. In the appendix we show the following results.
8In the usual sense that we will assume that, given equation (5), the money supply follows the path
necessary to implement the short-term nominal interest rate dictated by the Taylor-rule.
81. NKPC with no indexation
In the case of no indexation, as in Ascari and Ropele (2004), the log-linearisation of
(11) leads to the following equations
ˆ πt = βˆ πt+1 + λ(¯ π)ˆ mct + λ(¯ π)
(1 − ¯ π)(1− σc)
(1 − αβ¯ πθ)
ˆ Yt + λ(¯ π)
µ
¯ π − 1






1 − αβ¯ πθ
´h




θˆ πt+1 + ˆ ψt+1
i
(22)
where λ(¯ π)=(1−α¯ πθ−1)(1−αβ¯ πθ).
α¯ πθ .
2. NKPC with partial indexation to long-run inﬂation
In the case of LRI, the log-linearisation of (13) leads to the following equations
ˆ πt = βˆ πt+1+λLR(¯ π)ˆ mct+λLR(¯ π)
¡
1 − ¯ π(1−ε)¢
(1 − σc)
¡
1 − αβ¯ π(1−ε)θ¢ ˆ Yt+λLR(¯ π)
Ã
¯ π(1−ε) − 1







1 − αβ¯ π(1−ε)θ
´h




θˆ πt+1 + ˆ ψt+1
i
. (24)
where λLR(¯ π)=(1−α¯ π(1−ε)(θ−1))(1−αβ¯ π(1−ε)θ).
α¯ π(1−ε)θ . Note that (23) and (24) are the same as
(21) and (22) respectively, where simply ¯ π is replaced by ¯ π(1−ε). Hence, putting ε =0 ,
one gets back to the previous case of no indexation.
3. NKPC with partial indexation to past inﬂation







Etˆ πt+1 + λP(¯ π)ˆ mct + λP(¯ π)
¡
1 − ¯ π1−ε¢
(1 − σc)
1 − αβ¯ π(1−ε)θ
ˆ Yt + (25)
+λP(¯ π)
µ
¯ π1−ε − 1






1 − αβ¯ π(1−ε)θ
´h




θˆ πt+1 − θεˆ πt + ˆ ψt+1
i
(26)
where λP(¯ π)=(1−α¯ π(1−ε)(θ−1))(1−αβ¯ π(1−ε)θ)
(1+βε)α¯ π(1−ε)θ .
Looking carefully at the three NKPCs some comments are in order. First, in all
the three examples it appears a new driving variable for the dynamics of inﬂation: ˆ ψt.
As shown in the Appendix, ˆ ψt is (the log-deviation of) the numerator in the expression
9for the optimal resetting price, i.e., (11), (15) and (13) respectively. ˆ ψt is therefore
the present discounted value of future marginal costs, where the weights used in the
discounting depend on future expected output and inﬂation levels. These weights can in
turn be interpreted as the marginal change in demand (and hence production) for a unit
change in the optimal resetted price. Second, looking at (21) the eﬀect of allowing for a
positive trend inﬂation is evident: it alters dramatically the dynamics of inﬂation. With
respect to the standard NKPC obtained log-linearizing the model around zero inﬂation
steady state, (21) both changes the parameters values on the standard NKPC variables
and enriches the dynamic structure, adding more forward looking terms. Ascari (2004)
analyses thoroughly the implications of this fact for the dynamics of a standard sticky
price model. Third, comparing (21) and (23) it is clear the eﬀect of allowing for LRI.
As we noted, (23) and (24) are the same as (21) and (22) respectively, where simply
¯ π is replaced by ¯ π(1−ε). The eﬀect of allowing for positive trend inﬂation is therefore
counterbalanced by the indexation parameter. Hence these two eﬀects, positive long-run
inﬂation and indexation, go in opposite directions completely oﬀsetting each other when
indexation is full. Finally, allowing for PI adds another feature to the NKPC: it alters
its dynamic structure even further, since it produces a change in the dynamics of both
ˆ πt and ˆ ψt. As we know from Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), in this case
lagged inﬂation enters the NKPC, generating some inﬂation inertia. Besides, current
inﬂation enters the dynamic equation for ˆ ψt that instead was previously just depending
on future inﬂation.
3.2 The ineﬃciency loss
There is however another very important eﬀect that comes into the model when this
latter is generalized to positive trend inﬂation. To see this, note that at the ﬁrm level







10but at the aggregate level there is no exact correspondence between Yt and Nt. Indeed


























Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b) shows that st is bounded below one, so that st rep-
resents the resource costs due to relative price dispersion under the Calvo mechanism
with long-run inﬂation. Indeed, the higher st, the more labour is needed to produce a
given level of output. Note that st can also be rewritten as a ratio between two diﬀerent












as in Yun (1996) and Ascari (2004). Whenever there is price dispersion these two
indexes evolves diﬀerently from each other, determining a certain dynamics for st, that
negatively aﬀects the level of production. As Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a,b) noted,
st would not aﬀect the real variables up to ﬁrst order whenever there is no trend inﬂation
(i.e., ¯ π =1 )or whenever the resetted price is fully indexed to any variable whose steady
state level grows at the rate ¯ π.9
For the purpose of this paper, it is important to stress that allowing for positive
trend inﬂation and partial indexation makes a new variable to come into the model,
i.e., st, that determines: (i) an ineﬃciency loss in aggregate production due to price
dispersion; (ii) a further change in the dynamics of the model, as we see next.
9Indeed, if the ﬁxed price is partially indexed to π, Pt and e Pt evolve respectively up to ﬁrst order
according to
ˆ Pt = απ








b e P t = απ








Hence it is evident that if either π =1(i.e., no trend inﬂation) or ε =1(full indexation), up to ﬁrst
order the dynamics of the two price indexes are the same. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b) also stresses
that this is not the case up to second order.
113.2.1 Dynamics of st
We show in the Appendix that st has the following backward looking dynamics.
1. No indexation
If there is no indexation then st evolves according to the following law of motion












[¯ π − 1] ˆ πt + α¯ πθˆ st−1 (29)
where ¯ Ω = 1−α¯ πθ−1
α¯ πθ−1 .
2. LRI
If instead prices are partially indexed to long-run inﬂation, then st evolves as
















¯ π1−ε − 1
¤
ˆ πt + α¯ πθ(1−ε)ˆ st−1 (31)
where ˜ Ω = 1−α¯ π(θ−1)(1−ε)
α¯ π(θ−1)(1−ε) .
3. PI
Similarly, if prices are partially indexed to past inﬂation, the dynamics of st is
described by


















¯ π1−ε − 1
¤
(ˆ πt − εˆ πt−1)+α¯ πθ(1−ε)ˆ st−1 (33)
where ˜ Ω = 1−α¯ π(θ−1)(1−ε)
α¯ π(θ−1)(1−ε) .
The important thing to note is that ˆ st has a backward looking dynamics and such
further changes (and complicate) the dynamic structure of our model economy.
Finally, we just need an expression for the real marginal cost, which in the present
case is common to all ﬁrms and simply equals to the real wage. Using the ﬁrst order
12condition for consumption/labour choice, i.e., (19), the resource constraint Yt = Ct and












We then log-linearize it to obtain
σnˆ st +( σc + σn) ˆ Yt =ˆ mct. (35)
According to the assumed indexation scheme, we have three model economies. Each
of them is described by ﬁve log-linearised equations. (20) and (35) are common to all
models. The other three equations, instead, regards the dynamics of ˆ πt, ˆ ψt and ˆ st, and
thus they depend on the indexation scheme: (i) (21), (22) and (29) in the no indexation
case; (ii) (23), (24) and (31) in the LRI case; (iii) (25), (26) and (33) in the PI case. The
endogenous variables are: ˆ πt, ˆ Yt, ˆ mct, ˆ ψt, ˆ st, plus the instrument of monetary policy ˆ ıt.
To close the model and to endogenize the policy instrument we will consider the most
commonly employed Taylor-type rules in the literature.
Note that with respect to the standard case that assumes ¯ π =1 , allowing for positive
trend inﬂation and partial indexation makes the model economy more realistic, and also
much richer both in terms of convolution of parameters and, above all, in terms of
dynamic structure. In particular, the model has now two more variables that are absent
in the standard case. They signiﬁcantly alters the dynamic structure of our model
economy: ˆ ψt is a forward-looking variable, while ˆ st is a backward-looking one. It is
therefore not surprising that the dynamic properties of these models under Taylor-rule
policies could be quite diﬀerent from the standard case. This is what we move next.10
4 Contemporaneous Rule
The ﬁrst Taylor-type rule we analyze is the classic contemporaneous monetary policy
rule that, as in Taylor (1993, 1999), portrays the central bank as setting the nominal
10Moreover, note that substituting the dynamic equation for ˆ st into (35), we can obtain a dynamic
equation for the marginal cost that is just function of the aggregate variables. Above all, this equa-
tion implies a backward-looking dynamics, that is a persistent behaviour of the marginal cost. The
implication of this is the subject of ongoing research.
13interest rate as function of current inﬂation and output gap, that is
ˆ ıt = φπˆ πt + φY ˆ Yt. (36)
Moreover, we set α =0 .75,β=0 .99,θ=1 1 ,σ c =1and σn =1 .
In what follows we will ﬁrst consider the eﬀects of trend inﬂation on determinacy
in the no indexation case. Second, we then will generalize these results to the cases of
partial (and full) indexation. Third, we will consider inertial Taylor rules. Fourth, we
will present a dynamic analysis displaying the impulse response functions and analyzing
how the dynamic response of the economy changes with trend inﬂation. Finally, we will
consider the resulting unconditional variances of ˆ πt and ˆ Yt.
4.1 Indeterminacy and the Taylor principle
Figure 1 depicts determinacy regions in the parameter space (φπ,φ Y ) in the no index-
ation case for diﬀerent levels of annualized trend inﬂation, 0%, 2%, 4%, 6% and 8%.11
As stated in footnote 1, the average inﬂation in developed countries in post-war period
ﬁts in this range. A ﬁrst result is visually very evident.
Result 1 Indeterminacy. Positive levels of long run inﬂation greatly and unambigu-
ously aﬀect the determinacy properties of the rational expectation equilibrium. In
particular, as ¯ π increases determinate regions fairly rapidly contract, ruling out
implementable policy rules and increasing the likelihood of sunspots ﬂuctuations.12
Figure 1 well-renders how moderate levels of long-run inﬂation severely narrow the
determinacy region, whose boundaries close like scissors. Besides, Table I gives a ﬂavour
about the considerable strength of this eﬀect, by calculating the number of pairs (φπ,φ Y )
that delivers determinacy given the step of our grid search in the simulations. Indeed,
mildly increasing trend inﬂation from 0% to 2%, for example, produces a marked turn
11In Figure 1, as well as the following ones, we let φπ [0,5] and φY  [−1,5]. The grid search we use to
discern determinate combinations of φπ and φY takes a step increase of 0.05.T h i sm e a n st h a ti ne a c h
run of our routine we check 12221 diﬀerent interest rate rule speciﬁcations.
12Note that instability, in the sense of explosive behavior, never arises in this region of the parameter
space.
14of determinacy frontier in Figure 1 with associated a cospicuous removal of determi-
nate pairs which drop from 9232 down to 4293, approximately −53.5%. For economies
featuring levels of trend inﬂation of 4% or 6%, the shrinking is by far more dramatic.
Finally, at 8% trend inﬂation level, the only possible option for monetary policy to keep
control of the economy is to strongly react to inﬂation and not to react to output gap.
With respect to the zero trend inﬂation case the region shrinks by a striking 99%, mean-
ing that only 1% of the pairs (φπ,φ Y ) that lead to a determinate equilibrium in that
case continue to deliver determinacy when ¯ π =8 % . In such a case, there is hardly any
possible choice available to monetary policy to design an eventually optimal one.
Having shown trend inﬂation makes more likely indeterminacy, we now turn to dis-
cuss the implications from the point of view of the shape of determinacy regions. A
second key result is stated in the following.
Result 2 The “Taylor principle”. Restrictions on policy coeﬃcients valid under
zero inﬂation steady state do not generalize to the case of positive trend inﬂation.
In particular, the original “Taylor (1993, 1999) principle” (i.e., φπ > 1)b r e a k s
down. A generalized Taylor principle, however, still holds, but it is no longer a
suﬃcient condition (in the positive orthant of the space φπ,φ Y ).
Taylor (1993, 1999) suggests that the monetary policy rule (36) should feature a
value of φπ bigger than one. In this case, the nominal interest rate rises by more than
t h ei n c r e a s eo fi n ﬂation, determining an increase in the real interest rate that will curb
aggregate demand, thus guiding inﬂation expectations back to the rational expectation
equilibrium. The literature then labelled the condition φπ > 1 as the Taylor principle.
If φπ, φY > 0, however, it is well-known that in the standard microfounded Neo-
Keynesian model featuring zero-inﬂation steady state a contemporaneous interest rate
rule delivers a determinate rational expectations equilibrium if and only if (see, e.g.,




φY > 1 (37)
where κ represents the elasticity of inﬂation to the output gap in the standard NKPC.
As stressed by Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Woodford (2001, 2003) among others,
15condition (37) still corresponds to the Taylor principle in the sense that the nominal
interest rate should rise by more than the increase of inﬂation in the long run. In-
deed, as thoroughly discussed in Woodford (2003, chp. 4.2.2),
(1−β)
κ corresponds to the
long run multiplier of the inﬂation rate on output in a standard NKPC log-linearized
around the zero-inﬂation steady state. Hence the right-hand side of (37) “represents the
long-run increase in the nominal interest rate prescribed [...] for each unit permanent
increase in the inﬂation rate” (Woodford, 2003, p. 254). Therefore “The Taylor prin-
ciple continues to be a crucial condition for determinacy, once understood to refer to
cumulative responses to a permanent inﬂation increase” (Woodford, 2003, p. 256). As
such, some authors identify the original Taylor principle (i.e., φπ > 1)w i t ht h em o r e
general condition (37).
Interestingly, we can generalize further more the discussion in Woodford (2003) to
the trend inﬂation case. More generally, we can write (37) as
∂ˆ ı
∂ˆ π
|LR = φπ + φY
∂ ˆ Y
∂ˆ π
|LR > 1 (38)
(where LR stands for long run). Appendix 7.5.1 calculates ∂ ˆ Y
∂ˆ π |LR in our model econ-
omy, to get “the long-run increase in the nominal interest rate prescribed [...] for each
unit permanent increase in the inﬂation rate”. ∂ ˆ Y
∂ˆ π |LR is a complicated expression (see
equation (89)) that: (i) depends on trend inﬂation; (ii) for standard calibration values,
i tt u r n sn e g a t i v ev e r ys o o na st r e n di n ﬂation is positive; (iii) for standard calibration
values, it increases in absolute value as trend inﬂation increases. Moreover, plotting
then (38) for diﬀerent values of trend inﬂation, we exactly obtain the left-lateral frontier
in Figure 1.
The Taylor principle therefore continues to be a crucial condition for determinacy
in its general form (38), even in the case of trend inﬂation.13 Trend inﬂation, however,
signiﬁcantly changes the implications of (38).
Indeed, in a zero inﬂation steady state, condition (38) reads as (37) and it is a
necessary and suﬃcient condition in the positive orthant of the space (φπ,φ Y ). Besides,
the monetary policy literature amply focussed and discussed two main implications of
restriction (37). First, it implies a trade oﬀ between φπ and φY :v a l u e so fφπ less than
13Again see the discussion in footonote 27, p. 256, in Woodford (2003).
16one are admissible if the central bank appropriately compensate with relatively higher
values of φY , thus becoming more aggressive on output deviations. Second, actually
this trade-oﬀ is very weak. Since β is usually calibrated to be very close to one in
quantitative analysis, and since φπ > 1 is a suﬃcient condition for (37) to be satisﬁed,
then the so-called Taylor principle is often practically referred to φπ > 1. Indeed, the
literature mainly concentrated on φπ, and so in what follows we will refer to the Taylor
principle as φπ > 1. As a consequence, the value of φY has always been considered as
unimportant for determinacy.
As soon as one moves to non-zero steady state inﬂation economies, however, condi-
tion (38) ceases to be a suﬃcient condition in the positive orthant of the space (φπ,φ Y ).
The lower bound frontier, in fact, shifts upwards and it crosses the line deﬁned by condi-
tion (38) in the positive orthant. More importantly, both the implications of condition
(37) are rapidly and steadily turned upside down. First, even for moderate levels of
¯ π the aforementioned negative relation between φπ and φY on the left-lateral frontier
immediately turns into positive, such that there is no trade-oﬀ between the two (while
the lower-bound frontier turns counter clockwise). Indeed, along that frontier, if the
central bank wants to lower φπ it must at the same time respond less aggressively to
the output gap to avoid indeterminacy. Equivalently, a central bank much concerned
with output variations it has to be even tighter on inﬂation. Moreover, the higher trend
inﬂation the ﬂatter the left-lateral frontier and the larger the increase in φπ per unit of
φY .
Second, restriction φπ > 1 is clearly shown to be not suﬃcient for determinacy,
because the smallest determinate value of φπ positively co-moves with ¯ π. I nt h ec a s eo f
6% inﬂation, for example, φπ needs to be roughly higher than two. In addition, and
more importantly, the coeﬃcient on output gap now plays a key role, even for low values
of trend inﬂation. As an example, in Figure 1 we evidentiate with a dot the point that
corresponds to the canonical Taylor rule where φπ =1 .5 and φY =0 .5. As evident
from the graph, as soon as trend inﬂation is bigger than 2% the Taylor rule creates
indeterminacy. Hence, in real world application, the value of φY cannot be neglected
and it should basically be very low for realistic values of trend inﬂation.
17To fully understand the results above, it is crucial to stress they basically depend on
the long-run properties of the model and, particularly on the steady state relationship
between inﬂation and output, a surprisingly neglected issue in the literature. The long-
run Phillips curve is highly non-linear in the Neo-Keynesian model. As discussed in
Ascari (1998) and Ascari (2004), it is positively sloped when ¯ π =1(because of a
discounting eﬀect), but then turns quite rapidly negative even for extremely low value
of trend inﬂation, because of the strong price-dispersion eﬀect. As we show above, this
has quite radical implications on the celebrated Taylor principle. The results in most of
the literature are therefore based on a case (i.e., ¯ π =1 ) that is theoretically very special
(as well as empirically unrealistic).
All in all, Figure 1 persuasively suggests that as trend inﬂation takes up higher values
implementable monetary rules are characterized by an increasingly large and positive
coeﬃcient on inﬂation deviations and a very small, if not zero, coeﬃcient on output gap.
Essentially, this translates in the envision of a central bank that, as ¯ π increases, should
increasingly be more concerned with inﬂation variations and eventually becomes a strict
inﬂation targeting.
Furthermore, note that these results are in line with the analysis of Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2004a,b) and of Bullard and Mitra (2002). Even if dealing with two very dif-
ferent problems, both these papers robustly suggest monetary policy rule characterized
by a high coeﬃcient on φπ and a close to zero coeﬃcient on φY . Despite our analysis
tackles still another issue, it does deliver the same policy prescription for central banks
behavior. Indeed, we ﬁnd that whenever ¯ π is allowed to be positive, the determinate
region shrinks towards those values being the only admissible ones.
Finally, it follows that allowing for positive trend inﬂation puts into question the
validity of the leaning against the wind optimal policy in Clarida et al. (1999). As trend
inﬂation increases, central bank can not aﬀord to respond to output, but is should just
concentrate on inﬂation. Ascari and Ropele (2004) indeed shows this to be true also for
the optimal policy and provides basic intuition of why this happens.
184.2 Indexation
In this section we look at how our results change if we allow non-adjusting ﬁrms to index
their prices. As in the previous section, Figure 2 shows the determinacy regions in the
space (φπ,φ Y ) for diﬀerent levels of annualized trend inﬂation, 0%, 2%, 4%, 6% and 8%
allowing for partial indexation (ε =0 .5) and full indexation in the two cases described
in Section 2.3.
Result 3 Allowing for indexation counteracts the eﬀects of trend inﬂation described in
the previous Section.
The qualitative results of the previous section are still valid, while not surprisingly
partial indexation tends to mitigate the eﬀect of ¯ π on the determinacy regions. As
illustrated in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2, when εLR = εP = 50%,p o s i t i v el e v e l so f
trend inﬂation do still narrow down determinacy regions although the contraction is now
more sluggish. Importantly, indexation makes the lowest possible value of φπ much less
sensitive to trend inﬂation. Indeed, in Figure 1 φπ needs to be at least 2 or greater than
3 to guarantee determinacy in the cases of 6% and 8% trend inﬂation respectively. When
partial indexation is allowed, instead, the smallest implementable value for φπ moves
only slightly from 1. Finally, and paralleling the case of no indexation, the overall picture
shows once again that as trend inﬂation increases the central bank has a smaller set of
available implementable policies that force the monetary authority to respond more to
inﬂation deviations and less to output gap, implying no trade-oﬀ between φπ and φY .
Note that full indexation completely neutralize any eﬀect of trend inﬂation, since it
is clear from Section 2.3 that when ε =1trend inﬂation does not enter any structural
equations. Therefore, whatever the value of ¯ π, full indexation (both in the case of past
and long-run indexation) makes the model behaves as in the case of zero trend inﬂation
and full indexation.14
14Indeed, the reader should be careful here. By looking at the formulas in Section 3.1, it is easy
to check that: (i) in the case of indexation to long-run inﬂation, the structural equations under zero
inﬂation and no indexation coincides with the ones under full indexation; (ii) this is instead not true for
the case of indexation to past inﬂation. In this latter case, in fact, indexation changes the dynamics of
the structural equations (see (25)) and hence the dynamic properties of the model economy. If indexation
if full, then, trend inﬂation does not matter for the dynamic properties of the model economy (since the
19Result 4 For a given level of trend inﬂation, indexation to past inﬂation always de-
livers a set of implementable policies greater that the case of long-run indexation.
Moreover, full indexation to past inﬂation restores the original Taylor principle
(φπ > 1) a necessary and suﬃcient condition for determinacy.
A ﬁnal point we make regards the diﬀerences that characterize the two indexation
schemes. Table 1 reports the number of implementable rules with partial indexation.
For any level of trend inﬂation, partial PI is less likely to deliver sunspots ﬂuctuations
than the case of LRI. Moreover, even under long-run price stability (i.e., ¯ π =0 ) , full PI
exhibits a bigger set of implementable policies with respect to the other two cases (i.e.,
no indexation and LRI, which are indistinguishable when ¯ π =0 ).
Having said that, it is worth observing that the set of implementable policies in the
case of PI is enlarged with respect to the case of LRI mainly because the lower bound
frontier tilts downward, while the left-lateral frontier exhibits a very similar behavior
in the two cases. This means that most of the extra policy options available for the
monetary authority in the PI case regards the peculiar possibility of more pro-cyclical
monetary policy (i.e., more negative values of φY ). In the other words, the central bank
can still ensures determinacy of equilibria if remains looser on inﬂation deviations but,
oddly enough, respond more pro-cylically to ˆ Yt.
Moreover, full PI restores the pivotal role of the original Taylor principle, i.e., φπ > 1.
Indeed, quite interestingly, with 100% PI, φπ > 1 becomes a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for determinacy. PI acts on the lower bound frontier which moderately turns
clockwise and eventually becomes vertical when indexation is full in correspondence of
φπ =1 15.
4.3 Inertial policies
Empirical works on Taylor rules show that central banks tend to gradually adjust the
nominal interest rate in response to changes in economic conditions (see, e.g., Rudebusch,
supply side equations do not depend on ¯ π), but indexation does obviously matter. This explains why the
model economy under zero inﬂation and no indexation behaves diﬀerently from the one characterized
by full indexation to past inﬂation (whatever trend inﬂation).
15This means that also the left-lateral frontier moves with the indexation parameter, for any given
level of trend inﬂation and becomes vertical whit 100% PII at φπ =1 .
201995, Judd and Rudebusch,1998 or Clarida et al., 2000). Moreover recent literature has
emphasized the importance of inertial central bank behavior in the conduct of monetary
policy with a forward-looking private sector (e.g., Woodford, 2003). Thus, in this section
we explore the eﬀects of positive trend inﬂation on the determinacy properties when our
contemporaneous Taylor rule is modiﬁed to be
ˆ ıt = φπˆ πt + φY ˆ Yt + φiˆ ıt−1. (39)
Figure 3 reports our numerical results displaying four panels where φi =0 .5,1,2 and 5.
Each panel represents determinacy regions in the parameter space (φπ,φ Y ) for diﬀerent
values of ¯ π, holding the remaining parameters at their baseline values.
Result 5 Interest rate inertia makes indeterminacy less likely.
The top-left panel of Figure 3 illustrates the case of φi =0 .5. Compared to Figure 1
where φi =0 , we note that a positive degree of monetary policy inertia visibly enlarges
the determinacy region of the parameter space. The beneﬁts of policy inertia become
increasingly more pronounced, as the central bank controls the rate of change of nominal
interest rate, rather than its level, as shown in panel (b), and as we consider, in the
terminology of Woodford (2003) explosive or superinertial monetary policy rules, that
is φi =2and φi =5(see panels (c) and (d)).
The somewhat counterintuitive feature that explosive rules enlarge the determinacy
region therefore survives in the trend inﬂa t i o nc a s e . A sd i s c u s s e di nR o t e m b e r ga n d
Woodford (1999), in a similar model but with zero inﬂation steady state, it is exactly
the possibility of explosiveness of the nominal interest rate that keeps the model on
track.16
Result 6 Interest rate inertia makes the Taylor principle (i.e., φπ > 1) plainly insignif-
icant, in the sense that it is the value of φY that actually matters for determinate
equilibria. Surprisingly, monetary policy should not respond too much to output
gap to prevent indeterminate equilibria.
16Needless to say that, of course, the case of no feedback from inﬂation and output gap on the nominal
interest rate (i.e., φπ = φY =0 ) is of course indeterminate, for values of φi bigger than 1.
21More signiﬁcant is however the combined eﬀect that inertial policy and trend inﬂa-
tion has on the validity of the Taylor principle. In the standard model with zero steady




φY > 1 − φi (40)
and therefore inertia enlarges the determinacy region, such that φi =1is a suﬃcient
condition for a determinate equilibrium. Moreover, a suﬃcient condition φπ > 1 − φi
can be easily checked from any Taylor rule estimate. Note that this latter implies no
role for φY .
Again trend inﬂation radically changes the implications of the model. Indeed, looking
at panel (b), it is evident that there is no more necessary condition on φπ (provided that
is positive); on the contrary, we can eventually state a suﬃcient condition on φY . When
¯ π equals 4% or 8%, a suﬃcient condition for determinacy is φY lower than 2 or 0,
respectively, whatever the (positive) value of φπ. In particular, for moderate levels of
trend inﬂation (4% to 8%) what matters for determinacy is that monetary policy should
basically not respond to the output gap.
As stressed in Section 4.1, this is due to the change in the sign of ∂ ˆ Y
∂ˆ π |LR. The
relevant frontier is then positively sloped in the space (φπ,φ Y ), such that monetary
policy can aﬀord to be looser on inﬂation only if it simultaneously becomes looser on
output. In other words, being tough on output gap can easily generate indeterminacy,
when monetary policy is characterized by an inertial (or superinertial) Taylor rule and
moderate trend inﬂation.
Finally, it is easy to interpret graphically the eﬀect of inertia in setting the interest
rate, by comparing Figure 1 and the panels in Figure 3. The left-lateral frontier still




|LR > 1 − φi (41)
while the lower bound frontier exits the positive orthant. As a consequence, the crossing
point of these two frontiers moves leftward as inertia increases. This in turn determines
our results above: (i) the enlargement of the determinacy region; (ii) the consequent
17Indeed note that in panel (b) the lines pass through the point (φπ =0 ,φ Y =0 ).
22irrelevance of the original Taylor principle (i.e., φπ > 1); (iii) the crucial role of φY that
multiplies a negative quantity.
4.4 Dynamic Analysis
4.4.1 Impulse response functions
We now conduct some dynamic simulations and address the question of how trend
inﬂation and indexation aﬀect the dynamic properties of the model economy, in terms
of impulse response functions and output/inﬂation variance frontier.18
To this purpose, as in Galí (2003), ﬁrst we add to the equation of ˆ πt a cost-push
shock ut,w h o s el a wo fm o t i o ni s
ut = ρut−1 + ηt
where 0 ≤ ρ<1 and ηt is a i.i.d. random variable with zero mean and variance σ2
η.
Second, we need to choose speciﬁc values for φπand φY , and we stick to the original
Taylor speciﬁcation, setting φπ =1 .5 and φY =0 .5 (and φi =0 ).19
Figure 4 displays the impulse response functions of output gap, inﬂation rate, nom-
inal and real interest rate to a 1% cost-push shock, setting ρ =0 .8,b o t hi nt h ec a s eo f
no indexation (the left column) and PI (the right column). Each panel reports diﬀerent
time patterns associated to increasing levels of trend inﬂation, for which the model is
locally determinate.
The top-left panel displays the standard case of zero inﬂation steady state and no
indexation. In response to a unit cost-push shock the monetary feedback rule calls for a
suﬃciently large increase in the nominal interest so to generate a positive real interest
rate. Such a response, in turn, opens up a series of negative output gaps that gradually
drives inﬂation rate back to neutral.
Result 7 Increasing levels of positive trend inﬂation shift outward the impulse response
functions of output and inﬂation, following a cost-push shock.
18To solve for the rational expectation equilibrium and compute the impulse response function and
variance frontiers we used the MATLAB version of Soderlind’s codes available on the web.
19The results of this section do not qualitatively change if other values of φπand φY are chosen.
23Consider now the case of 2% long-run inﬂation and no indexation.20 Although the
qualitative patterns are very similar to the case of zero inﬂation steady state, some
important diﬀerences emerge. First, a positive level of trend inﬂation visibly alters the
impact eﬀects by producing an outward shift. Second, the outward shift of the impulse
response function remains eﬀective throughout the whole return path to steady state
thus suggesting a tighter monetary policy and a deeper recession. In short, consistently
with the results in Ascari and Ropele (2004), the higher is trend inﬂation, the worse
the trade-oﬀ monetary policy is facing: the deeper is the recession and the higher the
deviation of inﬂation from its steady state level.
The second column of Figure 4 shows the eﬀects of partial PI.21 As before trend
inﬂation, either 2% or 4%, shift outwards the impulse response functions both on impact
and on the whole adjustment path. Note that however, the shape of the impulse response
function is now much diﬀerent. As stressed by Christiano et al. (2005), PI creates the
hump-shape in the impulse responses of output and inﬂation, because of the relatively
richer dynamic structure due to the inclusion of πt−1 in the New Keynesian Phillips
curve. For the same reason, persistence also increases with respect to the model with
no indexation. Moreover, Figure 4 shows the comparison with the full indexation case22
(i.e., the thick solid line), whose impulse response is unaﬀected by the trend inﬂation
level. In this case, we have πt−1 entering the NKPC with the highest value, while the
variable st disappears from the model, such that the eﬀect on the persistence of the
impulse response is a priori ambiguous. Figure 4, however, visually shows that full
indexation tends to increase persistence, other things equal.
4.4.2 Unconditional Variance Frontiers
We now turn our attention to analyse the eﬀects of trend inﬂation and indexation on
unconditional variances of output and inﬂation, the arguments that are typically thought
20For the standard Taylor rule, we can just plot two impulse responses, since, as shown in Figure 1,
for trend inﬂation equals to 4% onwards the model with no indexation is indeterminate in this case.
21We do not report the impulse response functions for LRI because such indexation rule only generates
a (downward) rescaling with respect to the no indexation case. Again, the eﬀect of LRI is just to
counterbalance the trend inﬂation one.
22As in Christiano et al. (2005).
24to characterize the central bank’s loss function.
Because there are two policy coeﬃcients in our interest rate rule on which to construct
the variability frontier we proceed as follows. For diﬀerent levels of ¯ π, we compute the
loci of output-inﬂation variability points by varying, in turn, one of the argument in the
subrange [0,3] and keeping the other ﬁxed at a chosen value. When we vary φπ,p a n e l s
(a) and (c) of Figure 5, φY is set to 0.5; while when we vary φY , panels (b) and (d), φπ
is set to 2.5.23
Result 8 Increasing levels of positive trend inﬂation shift outward the policy frontiers,
leading to worse outcomes for both inﬂation and output variability.
This is the main result of this section, and we think a quite important one. It is
evidently shown by the strong outward shift of the variance frontiers in Figure 5.24
The attainable points with zero trend inﬂation in the space (φY ,φ π) are not anymore
so as ¯ π rises: either an higher value of σ2
Y is necessary for the same σ2
π or viceversa.
Moreover, as trend inﬂation increases, the policy frontier substantially shortens (i.e.,
it is characterized by a fewer number of points), because of the model entering the
indeterminacy region.
Panels (c) and (d) clearly reveal that again LRI tends to oﬀset the eﬀects of trend
inﬂation on the policy frontiers, neutralizing it in the case of full LRI.
Result 9 For a given level of trend inﬂation ¯ π, LRI shifts the locus of output-inﬂation
variability frontier inwards, therefore oﬀsetting the trend inﬂation eﬀects.
Moreover, as we know from previous sections, partial indexation makes determinacy
regions larger, hence the loci plotted in panels (c) and (d) comprise more points.
Figure 6 depicts the case of PI. Here, the results are for certain aspects more surpris-
ing. Although, we still observe a substantial shift of variability loci towards a welfare-
worsening territory as ¯ π increases, PI generates a much higher output and inﬂation
23This value is diﬀerent from the standard Taylor rule one (i.e., φπ =1 .5) we used in the previous
section, just for convenience of presentation. The forntiers would exhibit otherwise very few points as
trend inﬂation increases, because the model would quickly enter the indeterminacy region.
24As shown in Ascari and Ropele (2005) the deterioration of output/inﬂation policy frontier as trend
inﬂation incresaes is also present when the moneteary policy is conducted optimally under eihter discre-
tion or commitment.
25variability with respect to the case of no indexation or LRI. This is just the other side
of the coin of the fact that this type of indexation increase the endogenous persistence
of the model. This result suggests that actually PI may indeed match some empirical
regularities as stressed by Christiano et al. (2005), but theoretically may be very diﬃ-
cult to justify because of imposing high costs on agents’ welfare. Finally, it is important
to note that full indexation does not deliver the lower frontier. In other words, partial
indexation (e.g., 50% in the ﬁgure) yields an eﬃcient frontier always below the one ob-
tained in the case of full indexation for values of trend inﬂation up to 6%. This suggests
that full PI would not be optimal in a new keynesian model.25
Result 10 PI strongly worsens the policy frontier, for any given level of trend inﬂation.
Moreover, full indexation does not deliver the lowest possible policy frontier.
5R o b u s t n e s s
5.1 Alternative Interest Rate Rules
In this section we explore whether the results of previous sections are robust to simple
variants of the Taylor rule largely proposed in the literature. In particular we consider:
forward-looking interest rate rule (FL, henceforth): it = φπEtˆ πt+1 +φY Etˆ Yt+1 +φiˆ ıt−1;
backward-looking interest rate rule (BL, henceforth): ˆ ıt = φπˆ πt−1+φY ˆ Yt−1+φiˆ ıt−1;a n d
two types of hybrid interest rate rules: ˆ ıt = φπEtˆ πt+1 + φY ˆ Yt + φiˆ ıt−1 (H1, henceforth)
and ˆ ıt = φπˆ πt + φY Etˆ Yt+1 + φiˆ ıt−1 (H2, henceforth).
The general conclusion of this section is that the key results found in previous analysis
extend to all these cases. In particular, trend inﬂation again substantially changes the
determinacy region in the parameter space and the dynamic properties of the model
economy.
Moreover, for the cases of FL, H1 and H2 rules, Figures 7 and 8 show indeed how
increasing levels of trend inﬂation impact the determinacy regions, basically in the same
way described in the previous sections. The upshot is once again a substantial reduction
in the number of implementable interest rate rules, which according to Tables 3, 5 and 6
appear to be more severe in the case of H1 rule. This reduction is still mainly due to the
25This analysis is the subject of ongoing research.
26clockwise movement, as trend inﬂation increases, of the equivalent of condition (37) for
the diﬀerent analyzed rules. Again, the Figures and Tables show that both indexation
schemes and inertia have the same eﬀects as above.
5.1.1 Lagged Interest Rate Rule
The case of a central bank following a lagged interest rate rule is somewhat more involved
and deserves a separate comment. As already known in the literature (e.g., Bullard and
Mitra, 2002), in contrast to all the cases discussed so far, the BL rule can generate
explosiveness of the solution, such that the rational expectations equilibrium is unstable
and, if perturbed, it never returns to the steady state. Look at panel (a) of Figure 9
which depicts the standard case of zero inﬂation steady state.26 The panel is divided into
four regions by two lines, one of which is almost horizontal at φY = 2, while the other
corresponds to the equivalent of condition (38) in the BL case. There is, however, an
important diﬀerence with respect to the previous cases: in the parameters space above
t h ea l m o s th o r i z o n t a ll i n ea tφY = 2, the determinacy region now lies on the left of
condition (37) and not on its right, where instead the region is in this case explosive.27
The other panels of Figure 9 shows the eﬀect of increasing trend inﬂation. Graph-
ically it is still the same, because the line corresponding to (38) again visibly rotates
clockwise.28 However, due to the fact that now the determinacy region lies partly on
the left and partly on the right of this line, the eﬀect of trend inﬂation is less clear-
cut. Roughly speaking, dividing the parameters space in two regions, as trend inﬂation
increases: (i) above the almost horizontal line at φY = 2, the instability region progres-
sively shrinks and gives way to new determinate combinations; (ii) below the almost
horizontal line at φY = 2, the indeterminacy region enlarges and reduces the number of
implementable (i.e., determinate) rules. Note that while (ii) is the usual eﬀect analyzed
26This Figure is construcetd diﬀerently from the others, since we need to distinguish among three
diﬀerent regions for each panel: (i) determinacy = white region; (ii) indeterminacy = small dots region;
(iii) instability = darkest region.
27Note that in the parameters space below the almost horizontal line at φY = 2, the determinacy
region lies, instead, as usual below condition (37).
28The other almost horizontal line discriminating among the diﬀerent regions in the parameter space
is instead only little sensitive to changes in trend inﬂation for our calibration values. Basically, as trend
inﬂation increases, it tends to become horizontal at φY =2 , moving counterclockwise.
27in the previous sections, (i) is the peculiarity of the BL rule. Everything then rests on
the relative strength and dynamic adjustment of (i) and (ii).
Looking at the size of the eﬀects (i) and (ii), (i) is stronger such that, positive
trend inﬂation delivers always a larger determinacy region with respect to the case
of zero inﬂation steady state (see ﬁrst panel of Table 4). From a pure point of view
of implentability, in the BL case a positive level of long run inﬂation might hence be
desiderable and convenient, as it considerably enlarges the set of determinate monetary
rules.
Looking at the dynamic adjustment as ¯ π increases, then, (i) is quicker than (ii),
so that initially the determinate pairs (φY ;φπ) increases. Soon the movement in (i)
clears the whole upward region from explosive behavior, and only (ii) remains, such
that further increasing trend inﬂation reduces the determinacy region, as reported in
Table 4.
As trend inﬂation takes up higher values, then, a central bank following a lagged
interest rate rule is progressively left with two options to guarantee determinacy. On the
one hand, it might respond to inﬂation deviations and be more cautious towards output
gap, in line with previous analysis. On the other hand, the central bank can instead
respond aggressively to output gap, i.e. φY > 2, regardless to the value of φπ. Again,
trend inﬂation makes the Taylor principle useless and the value of φY what matters
most. In sum,
Result 11 When the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate as function of
lagged inﬂation and lagged output gap (with no inertia), positive levels of long run
inﬂation actually increase the set of determinate policy rules, relative to the case
of zero inﬂation steady state.
Moreover, as trend inﬂation increases: (i) the indeterminacy region expands; (ii)
the explosive region decreases; (iii) the determinacy region initially enlarges and
then reduces.
Regarding the eﬀects of indexing prices or inclusi o no fa ni n e r t i a lt e r mi nt h er u l e
the general results discussed in the previous sections simply carry on also in this case.
Besides, inertia has an additional eﬀect: it shifts upward the almost horizontal line in
28Figure 9. As a result, the eﬀect described in (i) becomes progressively less important and
disappear from the parameters space for superinertial policies. Being (i) the peculiarity
of the BL rule, it follows that for highly inertial policies, the properties of the model
economy under BL rules are very similar to the other monetary policy rules.
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we analyze the robustness of our ﬁndings to a number of variations in our
model structural parametrization for the case of contemporaneous rule.29 In particular,
Figure 10 shows the determinacy region changing in turn the following parameters values:
θ =4 , α =0 .5, σc =5 and σn =5 .
As expected, a lower value of the elasticity of substitution across goods or a lower
value of the Calvo parameter make the determinacy frontier to close less rapidly when
compared to the baseline calibration (see panels (a) and (b) of Figure 10). This leaves
room to a relatively larger set of implementable policies for a given value of trend
inﬂation and, in principle, determinate rules are also possible for even higher values.30
Moreover, the original Taylor speciﬁcation turns out to be determinate for trend inﬂation
levels up to 6%, in the case of θ =4 , or also 8%, in the case α =0 .5.
Considering higher values for the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of consump-
tion and labour supply, the results are again qualitatively identical to the one presented
above (see panels (c) and (d) of Figure 10). The lower bound frontier is slightly more
sensitive to changes in σc, since as trend inﬂation increases the upward shift becomes
more pronounced. As a consequence the lower boundary cuts the left-lateral frontier in
correspondence of higher values of φπ. The smallest admissible values of φπ is evidently
pushed rightward, thus calling for an increasingly more conservative central bank.
The value of σc moreover turns out to be quite important for the FL, BL and H2
cases. As already noted by Bullard and Mitra (2002), Figure 11 displays that the position
of the almost horizontal line that characterizes Figures 7, 8 and 9 is quite sensitive to
the values of σc. Indeed, it shifts notably upwards with σc and this has strong eﬀects on
29T h eq u a l i t a t i v ee ﬀects of changes in the values these parameters are in accordance with intuition
and robust across diﬀerent type of rules, indexation and inertia.
30Low values of θ and α, in fact, imply higher values of sustainable inﬂation rate in the steady state.
For θ =4the upper bound on ¯ π rises to 34.6% (annually) and for α =0 .5 rises to 29.1%.
29the dimension of the determinacy/indeterminacy regions in our parameters space.
6 Conclusions
Despite average inﬂation in the post-war period in developed countries was moderately
diﬀerent from zero, most of the vast literature on monetary policy rules worked with
models log-linearized around zero inﬂation.
In this paper, we generalize a standard Neo-Keynesian model with Calvo staggered
price by taking a linear approximation around a general trend inﬂation level. Then we
use a Taylor rule to describe monetary policy. We then look at how the properties of
our model economy change as the trend inﬂation level varies.
The results show that trend inﬂation greatly aﬀects the previous results in the lit-
erature. In particular moderate levels of trend inﬂation: (i) modify the determinacy
region in the parameters space; (ii) alter the impulse response function of the model
economy after a cost-push shock. In line with Ascari (2004) and Ascari and Ropele
(2004), this paper therefore shows that the Neo-Keynesian framework is quite sensitive
to variations in the trend inﬂation level, in the sense that higher trend inﬂation basically
makes monetary policy much less eﬀective in controlling the dynamics of the economy.
Here we mainly concentrated on the eﬀects of trend inﬂa t i o no nt h es e to fi m p l e -
mentable monetary policy rules in order to deliver a determinate rational expectations
equilibrium. We show that trend inﬂation substantially changes the celebrated determi-
nacy condition that the literature labelled the Taylor principle.
Our key results are then generalized and proved to be robust to: (i) diﬀerent kinds
of Taylor type rules proposed in the literature; (ii) inertial Taylor rules for all the cases
in (i); (iii) indexation schemes used in the literature; (iv) diﬀerent parameter values.
In sum, this paper shows that the literature on monetary policy rules cannot neglect
trend inﬂation both in the empirical and theoretical analysis, because all the results
are very sensitive to low and moderate trend inﬂation levels, as empirically observed in
western countries.
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327A p p e n d i x
7.1 Derivation of the NKPC under no indexation
Here we provide details of the log-linearization of (11) which leads to the New Keynesian
Phillips curve (21) and (22) in the main text. We begin by re-writing numerator and



































The denominator can also be written as:









uc (t + j +1 )Yt+j+1
#
.






following expression for φt








Pt . Doing exactly the same steps for the numerator gives rise to the
following expression for ψt






Now we take a log-linear approximation of (42) and (43). φ is linearized around
ucY
(1−αβ¯ πθ−1), ψ around
ucYMC(i)
1−αβ¯ πθ , Yt around Y , π around ¯ π and uc (t) around Y −σc
ˆ ψt '
³
1 − αβ¯ πθ
´h









1 − αβ¯ πθ−1
´h




(θ − 1) ˆ πt+1 + ˆ φt+1
i
. (45)
With this results at hand we can compactly rewrite the log-linearized optimal price (11)
as
ˆ p∗
t (i) − ˆ Pt = ˆ ψt − ˆ φt. (46)
33In order to ﬁnd the New Keynesian Phillips curve we have to combine this last equation



































and hence the log-linearized version of (48) is
ˆ p∗
it − ˆ Pt =
µ
α¯ πθ−1
1 − α¯ πθ−1
¶
ˆ πt. (50)
Substituting (50) into (46), we obtain the New Keynesian Phillips curve under positive
trend inﬂation and no indexation described by the following three equations
ˆ πt =
·
1 − α¯ πθ−1
α¯ πθ−1
¸³





1 − αβ¯ πθ
´h









1 − αβ¯ πθ−1
´h




(θ − 1) ˆ πt+1 + ˆ φt+1
i
. (53)
Interestingly enough the above system can be reduced to only two equations. First write
the diﬀerence between ˆ ψt and ˆ φt as
³
ˆ ψt − ˆ φt
´
= αβ¯ πθ−1 (1 − ¯ π)(1− σc) ˆ Yt +
³
1 − αβ¯ πθ
´
ˆ MCt +
+θαβ¯ πθ−1 (¯ π − 1) ˆ πt+1 + αβ¯ πθ−1ˆ πt+1 + αβ¯ πθ−1
³
¯ πˆ ψt+1 − ˆ φt+1
´
where we also used ˆ uc (t)=−σcˆ Yt.
Next add and subtract αβ¯ πθ−1ˆ ψt+1 so to have
³
ˆ ψt − ˆ φt
´
= αβ¯ πθ−1 (1 − ¯ π)(1− σc) ˆ Yt +
³
1 − αβ¯ πθ
´
ˆ MCt +
+θαβ¯ πθ−1 (¯ π − 1) ˆ πt+1 + αβ¯ πθ−1ˆ πt+1 + αβ¯ πθ−1
³
ˆ ψt+1 − ˆ φt+1
´
+αβ¯ πθ−1 (¯ π − 1) ˆ ψt+1.












1 − α¯ πθ−1
´
β (1 − ¯ π)(1− σc) ˆ Yt +
¡
1 − α¯ πθ−1¢¡





1 − α¯ πθ−1
´
θβ(¯ π − 1) ˆ πt+1 +
³
1 − α¯ πθ−1
´
βˆ πt+1 +
+αβ¯ πθ−1ˆ πt+1 +
³
1 − α¯ πθ−1
´
β (¯ π − 1) ˆ ψt+1.
Now using the deﬁnition ˆ ψt we can substitute for ˆ ψt+1 = 1
αβ¯ πθ ˆ ψt−(1−αβ¯ πθ)
αβ¯ πθ
h
ˆ uc (t)+ˆ Yt + ˆ MCt
i
−
θˆ πt+1, ﬁnally obtaining
ˆ πt = λ(¯ π)
(1 − ¯ π)(1− σc)
(1 − αβ¯ πθ)
ˆ Yt + λ(¯ π) ˆ MCt + βˆ πt+1 + λ(¯ π)
(¯ π − 1)
(1 − αβ¯ πθ)
ˆ ψt (54)
where λ(¯ π)=(1−α¯ πθ−1)(1−αβ¯ πθ).
α¯ πθ . (54) and (44) then fully describe the NKPC in the no
indexation case and are reported in the main text.
7.2 Derivation of the NKPC under partial indexation to long-run in-
ﬂation
Here we provide details of the log-linearization of (13) which leads to the New Keynesian













t (i) − ˆ Pt = ˆ ψt − ˆ φt
























It is easy to check that
ˆ ψt =
³
1 − αβ¯ π(1−ε)θ
´h









1 − αβ¯ π(1−ε)(θ−1)
´h




(θ − 1) ˆ πt+1 + ˆ φt+1
i
.(56)



































and hence the log-linearized version of (58) is
ˆ p∗
it − ˆ Pt =
Ã
α¯ π(1−ε)(θ−1)
1 − α¯ π(1−ε)(θ−1)
!
ˆ πt. (60)
The New Keynesian Phillips curve under partial indexation to long-run inﬂation is there-
fore described by (55), (56), and
ˆ πt =
Ã




ˆ ψt − ˆ φt
´
. (61)
Note that these three equations are the same as in the previous case, where simply ¯ π is
replaced by ¯ π(1−ε). Therefore, proceeding as above the system can be reduced to only
two equations, that is
ˆ πt = λLR(¯ π)
¡
1 − ¯ π(1−ε)¢
(1 − σc)
¡
1 − αβ¯ π(1−ε)θ¢ ˆ Yt + λLR(¯ π) ˆ MCt + βˆ πt+1 + λLR(¯ π)
¡
¯ π(1−ε) − 1
¢
¡
1 − αβ¯ π(1−ε)θ¢ ˆ ψt
(62)
where λLR(¯ π)=(1−α¯ π(1−ε)(θ−1))(1−αβ¯ π(1−ε)θ).
α¯ π(1−ε)θ . (62) and (55) then fully describe the
NKPC in the case of indexation to long run inﬂation, as reported in the main text.
7.3 Derivation of the NKPC under partial indexation to past inﬂa-
tion31
Here we provide details of the log-linearization of (15) which leads to the New Keynesian













t (i) − ˆ Pt = ˆ ψt − ˆ φt
























31See also Maury and Sahuc (2004).
36It is easy to check that
ˆ ψt =
³
1 − αβ¯ π(1−ε)θ
´h









1 − αβ¯ π(1−ε)(θ−1)
´h





(θ − 1) ˆ πt+1 − ε(θ − 1)ˆ πt + ˆ φt+1
i
. (64)





























Note that (66) implies that in steady state
p∗(i)
P is the same as in the previous case, i.e.,
(59). The log-linearized version of (66) is thus
ˆ p∗
it − ˆ Pt =
Ã
α¯ π(1−ε)(θ−1)
1 − α¯ π(1−ε)(θ−1)
!
(ˆ πt − εˆ πt−1). (67)
The New Keynesian Phillips curve under partial indexation to long-run inﬂation is there-
fore described by (63), (64) and
ˆ πt = εˆ πt−1 +
Ã
1 − α¯ π(1−ε)(θ−1)
α¯ π(1−ε)(θ−1)
!³
ˆ ψt − ˆ φt
´
. (68)
Again we can follow the same steps as above to reduce the system to two equations.
First write the diﬀerence between ˆ ψt and ˆ φt as
ˆ ψt − ˆ φt = αβ¯ π(1−ε)(θ−1)
³
1 − ¯ π(1−ε)
´
(1 − σc) ˆ Yt +
³





¯ π(1−ε) − 1
´
ˆ πt+1 + αβ¯ π(1−ε)(θ−1)ˆ πt+1 +
−θεαβ¯ π(1−ε)(θ−1)
³
¯ π(1−ε) − 1
´
ˆ πt − εαβ¯ π(1−ε)(θ−1)ˆ πt +
+αβ¯ π(1−ε)(θ−1)
³
ˆ ψt+1 − ˆ φt+1
´
+ αβ¯ π(1−ε)(θ−1)(¯ π(1−ε) − 1)ˆ ψt+1
where we also used ˆ uc (t)=−σcˆ Yt.
U s i n g( 6 8 )t os u b s t i t u t ef o r
³




ˆ ψt+1 − ˆ φt+1
´
into the last expression
yields (25) in the main text.
377.4 The ineﬃciency loss st
7.4.1 Dynamics of st
Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b), p. 16, it is easy to derive the expressions


























































































































































































































1 − α¯ πθ
"





2. Indexation to long run inﬂation
From (70) we get
s =
1 − α























1 − α¯ πθ(1−ε)
"





Note that this holds also for the case of indexation to past inﬂation. Indeed the
steady state value of s does not depend on the type of indexation. Note that this holds
generally whenever the resetted price is indexed to any variable that in steady state
grows at the rate ¯ π.
397.4.3 Log-linearization












but one should be careful since each indexation scheme has an accordingly diﬀerent
deﬁnition of ψt and φt.
1. No indexation
From (69) and using (72) and (73), it yields















































ˆ φt − ˆ ψt
´
+ α¯ πθ (θˆ πt +ˆ st−1). (76)
We may want to substitute for
³
ˆ φt − ˆ ψt
´
to express ˆ st as a function of ˆ πt. Substituting
then (51), we get
ˆ st =
³




ˆ φt − ˆ ψt
´
+ α¯ πθ (θˆ πt +ˆ st−1)=
=
³





1 − α¯ πθ−1
¸







ˆ πt + α¯ πθˆ st−1















ˆ πt + α¯ πθˆ st−1. (77)
2. Indexation to long-run inﬂation
40From (70) the law of motion of st becomes











































Using (75) and (74), it yields
ˆ st =
³




ˆ φt − ˆ ψt
´
+ α¯ πθ(1−ε)[θˆ πt +ˆ st−1]. (78)
Finally, substitute (61), we obtain
ˆ st =
³




ˆ φt − ˆ ψt
´
+ α¯ πθ(1−ε)[θˆ πt +ˆ st−1]=
=
³





1 − α¯ π(θ−1)(1−ε)
#


















ˆ πt + α¯ πθ(1−ε)ˆ st−1
















ˆ πt + α¯ πθ(1−ε)ˆ st−1. (79)
3. Indexation to past inﬂation
The law of motion of st in this case is approximated to













































and given (75) and (74)
ˆ st =
³




ˆ φt − ˆ ψt
´
+ α¯ πθ(1−ε)[θ(ˆ πt − εˆ πt−1)+ˆ st−1] (80)
41Finally make use of (68) to obtain
ˆ st =
³




ˆ φt − ˆ ψt
´
+ α¯ πθ(1−ε)[θ(ˆ πt − εˆ πt−1)+ˆ st−1]=
=
³





1 − α¯ π(θ−1)(1−ε)
#


















(ˆ πt − εˆ πt−1)+α¯ πθ(1−ε)ˆ st−1
















(ˆ πt − εˆ πt−1)+α¯ πθ(1−ε)ˆ st−1. (81)
7.5 Generalizing the Taylor principle
7.5.1 To trend inﬂation
Here we generalize the Taylor principle as discussed in Woodford (2003, chp. 4) to the
case of non-zero steady state inﬂation.
I nt h ec a s eo f : ( i )φπ,φY > 0; (ii) standard Neo-Keynesian model featuring zero-
inﬂation steady state; (iii) a contemporaneous interest rate rule; the original Taylor




φY > 1. (82)
As stressed by Woodford (2003, chp. 4), the logic is that the long run multiplier of
ˆ π on ˆ ı must exceed one:
∂ˆ ı
∂ˆ π
|LR = φπ + φY
∂ ˆ Y
∂ˆ π
|LR = φπ +
(1 − β)
κ
φY > 1 (83)
since given the standard NKPC
ˆ πt = βˆ πt+1 + κˆ Yt (84)
hence ∂ ˆ Y
∂ˆ π |LR =
(1−β)
κ > 0.





42which is the line in the Figure 1 correspondent to zero trend inﬂation: it goes through
the point (φπ =1 ;φY =0 )and is (highly) negatively sloped.
Here we show that in our model: (i) ∂ ˆ Y
∂ˆ π |LR depends on trend inﬂation; (ii) for
standard calibration values, ∂ ˆ Y
∂ˆ π |LR t u r n sn e g a t i v ev e r ys o o na st r e n di n ﬂation is positive;
(iii) for standard calibration values, ∂ ˆ Y
∂ˆ π |LR increases in absolute value as trend inﬂation
increases. As a result, indeed, the left-lateral frontier in Figure 1 coincides with condition
(38), generalised to allow for trend inﬂation.
The model consists of the following equations: (21),(22), (29) and (35). Diﬀerenti-
ating (29) we get
dˆ s
³










¯ Ω [¯ π − 1]
(1 − α¯ πθ)
= Θ. (85)
Then (35) yields
σndˆ s +( σc + σn)dˆ Y = dˆ mc (86)
and putting (85) into (86)
dˆ mc = σnΘdˆ π +( σc + σn)dˆ Y
dˆ mc
dˆ π




Diﬀerentiating (22) we obtain
dˆ ψ
dˆ π








1 − αβ¯ πθ
dˆ ψ
dˆ π











dˆ π from (87)
+
αβ¯ πθθ
1 − αβ¯ πθ
dˆ ψ
dˆ π





1 − αβ¯ πθ. (88)
Then we can substitute the above equation into (21) to get
ˆ π = βˆ π + λ(¯ π)ˆ mc + λ(¯ π)
(1 − ¯ π)(1− σc)
(1 − αβ¯ πθ)
ˆ Y + λ(¯ π)
µ
¯ π − 1
1 − αβ¯ πθ
¶
ˆ ψ
dˆ π(1 − β)=λ(¯ π)dˆ mc + λ(¯ π)
(1 − ¯ π)(1− σc)
(1 − αβ¯ πθ)
dˆ Y + λ(¯ π)
µ
¯ π − 1




(1 − ¯ π)(1− σc)
(1 − αβ¯ πθ)
dˆ Y
dˆ π





¯ π − 1





(1 − ¯ π)(1− σc)
(1 − αβ¯ πθ)
dˆ Y
dˆ π
=( 1 − β) − λ(¯ π)
"







¯ π − 1













(1 − ¯ π)(1− σc)
(1 − αβ¯ πθ)
+ λ(¯ π)(σc + σn)+λ(¯ π)
µ
¯ π − 1




=( 1 − β) − λ(¯ π)σnΘ − λ(¯ π)
µ
¯ π − 1




1 − αβ¯ πθ
¸
.





(1 − ¯ π)(1− σc)
(1 − αβ¯ πθ)(σc + σn)
+
µ
¯ π − 1













¯ π − 1






(1 − αβ¯ πθ)(σc + σn)
¸
.




in the more general model with positive trend inﬂa-




¯ π − αβ¯ πθ









¯ π − αβ¯ πθ




¯ π − 1
1 − αβ¯ πθ
¶
αβ¯ πθθ
(1 − αβ¯ πθ)(σc + σn)
.
(89)
It is easy to check that putting ¯ π =1 , one gets the usual dˆ Y
dˆ π =
(1−β)
κ and then condition
(37). Putting this expression into (38) and plotting it for diﬀerent values of trend
inﬂation, we exactly obtain the left-lateral frontier in Figure 1.
448T a b l e s
Contemporaneous Rule
¯ π =0 % ¯ π =2 % ¯ π =4 % ¯ π =6 % ¯ π =8 %
φi =0
























εPI = 100% 9680 9680 9680 9680 9680
Table 1. The table shows the number of combinations φπ and φy that
deliver a determinate equilibrium and in brackets the percentage reduction
relative to the case ¯ π =0 % . It is computed for σc=σn=1;θ=11,α=0.75 and.
β=0.99. Moreover, φπ ∈ [0,5] and φy ∈ [−1,5]. Step increase: 0.05.
45Inertial Contemporaneous Rules
π =0 % π =2 % π =4 % π =6 % π =8 %
φi =0 .5
























εPI =1 0 0 % 10890 10890 10890 10890 10890
φi =1
























εPI = 100% 12100 12100 12100 12100 12100
φi =2
























εPI = 100% 12220 12220 12220 12220 12220
φi =5
















εPI = 100% 12220 12220 12220 12220 12220
Table 2. See note in table 1.
46Forward-Looking Rule
π =0 % π =2 % π =4 % π =6 % π =8 %
φi =0
























εPI = 100% 5552 5552 5552 5552 5552
φi =0 .5
























εPI = 100% 7229 7229 7229 7229 7229
φi =1
























εPI = 100% 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106
φi =2
























εPI = 100% 12220 12220 12220 12220 12220
φi =5
















εPI = 100% 12220 12220 12220 12220 12220
Table 3. See note in table 1. 47Lagged Interest Rule
π =0 % π =2 % π =4 % π =6 % π =8 %
φi =0
























εPI = 100% 5958 5958 5958 5958 5958
φi =0 .5
























εPI = 100% 7563 7563 7563 7563 7563
φi =1
























εPI = 100% 9924 9924 9924 9924 9924
φi =2
























εPI = 100% 12220 12220 12220 12220 12220
φi =5
















εPI = 100% 12220 12220 12220 12220 12220
Table 4. See note in table 1.
48Hybrid Interest Rules (type 1)
π =0 % π =2 % π =4 % π =6 % π =8 %
φi =0
























εPI = 100% 9780 9780 9780 9780 9780
φi =0 .5
























εPI =1 0 0 % 10846 10846 10846 10846 10846
φi =1
























εPI = 100% 12100 12100 12100 12100 12100
φi =2
























εPI = 100% 12220 12220 12220 12220 12220
φi =5
















εPI = 100% 12220 12220 12220 12220 12220
Table 5. See note in table 1.
49Hybrid Interest Rules (type 2)
π =0 % π =2 % π =4 % π =6 % π =8 %
φi =0
























εPI =1 0 0 % 5148 5148 5148 5148 5148
φi =0 .5
























εPI = 100% 7660 7660 7660 7660 7660
φi =1
























εPI = 100% 10540 10540 10540 10540 10540
φi =2
























εPI = 100% 12220 12220 12220 12220 12220
φi =5
















εPI = 100% 12220 12220 12220 12220 12220
Table 6. S e en o t ei nt a b l e1 .





















Figure 1: Contemporanous interest rate rule and the eﬀects of trend inﬂation. The black






(a) LRI = 50% 













(b) PI = 50%













(c) PI = 100%



































































































Figure 3: Inertial contemporaneous rule





(a) Output with  ε=0%





(c) Inflation with  ε=0%





(e) Nominal Interest Rate with  ε=0%




(g) Real Interest Rate with  ε=0%





(b) Output with  ε
PI=50%, ε
PI=100%





(d) Inflation with  ε
PI=50%, ε
PI=100%





(f) Nominal Interest Rate with  ε
PI=50%, ε
PI=100%





(h) Real Interest Rate with  ε
PI=50%, ε
PI=100% 
π=0% π=2% π=4% π=6%
Figure 4: Impulse response function to unit cost-push shock (φπ =1 .5 and φY =0 .5).




































































π=0% π=2% π=4% π=6% π=8% ε=1
Figure 5: Eﬃciency frontiers for the contemporaneous interest rate rule with long run
inﬂation indexation.
















Y=0.5, ε=0.5 and ε=1
















Y∈[0,3], ε=0.5 and ε=1 
π=0% π=2% π=4% π=6% π=8% ε=1




















(c) Long Indexation 50%












(e) Long Indexation 100%












(b) Past Indexation 50%













(d) Past Indexation 100%











0% 2% 4% 6% 8%
















(a) H1: No Indexation







(c) H1 rule: LRI 50%







(e) H1 rule: PI 50%









(g) H1 rule: PI 100%









(h) H2 rule: PI 100%







(f) H2 rule: PI 50%









(d) H2 rule: LRI 50%









(b) H2: No Indexation










































Figure 8: Hybrid interest rate rules







(a) θ = 4













(b) α = 0.5














c  = 5














n  = 5


































(a) FL rule with  σ
c = 0.157










(b) FL rule with  σ
c = 3









(c) H2 rule with  σ
c = 0.157









(d) H2 rule with  σ
c = 3




















(e) BL rule,  σ
c = 0.157 and  π = 0%













(f) BL rule, σ
c = 3 and π = 0%













(g) BL rule,  σ
c = 0.157 and  π = 2%













(h) BL rule, σ























Figure 11: Sensitivity analysis (II)
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